Introduction
In both the EU and U.S., there are safe harbour provisions 23 in place that should, under certain conditions, provide online service providers (OSPs) 4 immunity in case of intellectual property infringement by third parties. However, the massive litigation cases against OSPs demonstrate that the safe harbour provisions are not effective nor efficient.
By providing OSPs immunity of third party liability, safe harbour provisions contribute to a climate where the behaviour of OSPs is dominated by short term business interests, which are not conducive for the enforcement of intellectual property rights by the OSPs, nor for the legal certainty of proprietors, internet users and OSPs alike.
The prerequisites of the safe harbour provisions to remain passive and only act reactively, lead to willful blindness, although OSPs are best positioned to proactively filter infringing use of content. Therefore this article asserts that the safe harbour provisions must be substituted by strict intermediary liability. As will be pointed out below, this transition is not as dramatic as it seems.
5
Safe harbour provisions were drafted at a moment when OSPs such as social media, still needed to be developed. They do not protect proprietors against infringement.
Moreover, the protection of OSPs against liability is an illusion. 3 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (E-Commerce Directive) and in the U.S.; Digital Millennium Copyright Act codified in 17 USC § 512, effective October 28, 1998 (DMCA). 4 With the online service provider (OSP) is meant an intermediary that is called an internet society service in the E-Commerce Directive and service provider in the DMCA. 5 Infra Chapter 7, this transition might not be as dramatic as one might expect.
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If one extrapolates the development in filter technology one can see that advocating safe harbour provisions has become a rearguard battle and that implementation of strict liability for OSPs is ineluctable.
Chapter 1 provides the reason why the safe harbour provisions do not connect well to the current problems;
Chapter 2 demonstrates the inability of safe harbour provisions to enforce proprietors' intellectual property rights;
Chapter 3 shows why the safe harbour provisions are inadequate to provide legal immunity to OSPs;
Chapter 4 elaborates on the neutrality prerequisite for OSPs to be eligible for the exemption of liability;
Chapter 5 explicates the different schools of thought on the duty of care;
Chapter 6 deals with the different degrees of monitoring obligations;
Chapter 7 demonstrates the less than dramatic implications of the strict liability regime for OSPs.
Chapter 1 Mismatch of law and legal needs
It is not surprising that the safe harbour provisions do not match with the needs of OSPs, proprietors and internet users: 6 the safe harbour provisions in the DMCA, 7 Lanham Act 7 and in the E-Commerce Directive 8 were all drafted around the millennium at a time when electronic commerce was perceived as "embryonic and fragile", 9 and internet auctions and social media were just a fledgling phenomenon. Legislators on both sides of the Atlantic assumed that limiting the liability of OSPs in case of intellectual property infringements would "ensure that the efficiency of the internet [would] continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services on the internet [would] continue to expand." 9 Soon the development of e-commerce proofed to be robust and user-generated content on social media started to blossom. If one compares legislations with safe harbour provisions for secondary liability of copyright infringement with Hong Kong that does not have these yet, it is interesting to note that also in Hong Kong the foreseen problems never seem to have materialised.
10
Chapter 2 Not solving the problems for proprietors
Two of the prerequisites OSPs have to comply with in order to be eligible for the safe harbour provisions work against the interests of proprietors.
The first prerequisite is that an OSP has no actual knowledge, 11 nor is aware of facts or circumstances that infringing activity is apparent. 1213 And in case it obtains such knowledge or awareness it must expeditiously remove or disable access to such content.
14 This has contributed to wilful ignorance by OSPs, which led to user-generated content that is infringing copyright and trademark rights on a massive scale 14 (see Chapter 3 "Not protecting OSPs from legal conflicts").
The second prerequisite is that OSPs should act neutrally in relation to content uploaded by third parties, for example user-generated content on social media or internet auctions. However, this is in conflict with OSPs' desire to harness technology to further Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2479190
10 Infra note 101. 11 Article 14(1)(a) E-Commerce Directive: "the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent." and 17 § USC512 (c)(1)(A)(i): "does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing." 12 Article 14(1)(a) E-Commerce Directive, id. and 17 § USC512 (c)(1)(A)(ii): "in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent."
14
Article 14(1)(b) E-Commerce Directive, supra note 3: "the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information." See also proprietors' burden to monitor and request for removals can be onerous.
Chapter 3 Not protecting OSPs from legal conflicts
Safe harbour provisions offer not only no legal certainty to proprietors, but also no safety to OSPs. One can distinguish three reasons. First they are still being sued by proprietors. 16 Second, a recurring claim against OSPs that is articulated louder as technology evolves, is the accusation that they wilfully turn a blind eye towards the infringements that are happening on their servers. Third, the OSPs should unnaturally restrict themselves against activist behaviour, stifling their entrepreneurial spirit, while their neutrality is still being disputed.
The first and second reason will be elaborated below. The third reason will be dealt with in Chapter 4 "Neutral hosting or activist". the OSP comes across these it must pay special attention to it and act, otherwise the exemption of intermediary liability will be lifted.
Still being sued
Another problem is that because of the fear to fall outside the exemption of liability some OSPs uncritically remove content after mistaken or bad faith complaints, 26 which can have chilling effects to creativity, and potentially render the OSPs liable for breaching the terms of service with the user.
Courts determine whether an OSP falls within the exemption of secondary liability by distinguishing the lack of enforcement of the OSP as wilful or deliberate ignorance from true ignorance. However, with ever faster evolving technology it is increasingly difficult to maintain no-scienter. In fact, the tipping point of omniscience has already reached spam and virus filter technologies.
Chapter 4 Neutral hosting or activist
One can observe a trend in jurisprudence of courts broadly interpreting eligibility and neutrality. 26 Uncritical removal of mistaken or bad faith complaints has nothing to do with filtering, which is distinguishing infringing from non-infringing material. Timothy Lee, "Warner Bros: we issued takedowns for files we never saw, didn't own copyright to", Ars Technica, November 10, 2011, available at: http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/11/warner-admits-it-issues-takedowns-for-files-ithasntlooked-at.ars (accessed August 18, 2013). 27 The E-commerce Directive gives three categories of internet society services, that are eligible for liability exemption: Article 12 "Mere conduit", Article 13 "Caching" and Article 14 "Hosting" of the E-Commerce Directive. In the U.S. the DMCA has a comparable system, but has an extra category for reference services; 28 38 Id., para. 113. Recital 42 of the Preamble to the E-Commerce Directive: "The exemptions from liability established in this Directive cover only cases where the activity of the information society service provider is limited to the technical process of operating and giving access to a communication network over which information made available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored, for the sole purpose of making the transmission more efficient; this activity is of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies that the information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored." However, the CJEU held that the payment terms and general information provided by Google and which are under Google's control, 39 cannot deprive Google of the exemptions from liability provided for in the E-Commerce Directive. 42 The relationship between keywords selected and the search terms entered by an internet user is not sufficient of itself to justify the view that Google has knowledge of, or control over, the data entered into its system by advertisers and stored in memory on its server. 43 The CJEU held that the role played by Google in the drafting of the commercial message which accompanies the advertising link or in the establishment or selection of keywords might not be neutral, 40 but leaves that decision to national courts. 55 Even though an OSP is aware of pervasive intellectual property infringement, "however, flagrant and blatant", this does not impose liability on the OSP, because it "furnishes at most a statistical estimate of a chance any particular posting is infringing (…)."Viacom Int'l Inc. v YouTube, Inc., supra note 10. 17 USC § 512(m): "Protection of Privacy.-Nothing in this section shall be construed to condition the applicability of subsections (a) through (d) on-(1) a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity, except to the extent consistent with a standard technical measure complying with the provisions of subsection (i)." 56 Recital 47 of the Preamble to the E-Commerce Directive: "Member States are prevented from imposing a monitoring obligation on service providers only with respect to obligations of a general nature; this does not concern monitoring obligations in a specific case and, in particular, does not affect orders by national authorities in accordance with national legislation." 61 Supra note 32. 57 The Court of Appeal in Leeuwarden's statement "[t]hat a filter to compare pictures well still has to be invented" demonstrates that the court is not aware of technical possibilities already available. Interestingly, the Netherlands Organisation of Applied Scientific Research (TNO) was not able to explain that a further distinction can be made within an automatic selection of pictures of similar chairs. Stokke v Marktplaats, Gerechtshof Leeuwarden, 107.001.948/01, BW6296, May 22, 2012, para. 8.7.
OSPs, and would make their business models unfeasible. 5859 In the EU, Article 3
Enforcement Directive includes these arguments for prohibiting effective enforcement. 65 However, the obligation to filter will be increased concomitant with the progress of filter technology. Therefore it is ineluctable that filter technology will bridge the gap between the safe harbour and strict liability for OSPs.
In 82 This seems arbitrary, since it would not address known infringers who infringe a slightly different copyright or trademark; nor would it address a repeat infringer operating under a different name.
In case the identity of the infringer or his internet protocol address is known. This would enable to check whether the known infringer has changed his ways for the good.
-In case the kind of infringement is known. This can provide clues of how to prevent similar infringements. For example, as mentioned in the Internet Auction cases, 83 one could monitor watches that were offered as new Rolex hours, under a certain price. Or obviously keywords that Google AdWords suggested, such as "imitation" or "copy", in combination with the trademark Louis Vuitton, as was established in Google France and Google. 84 However, the most effective and efficient monitoring is pre-upload filtering, which is based on comparing trademark or copyright information with information stored by rights holders in a database. Also in case of internet auctions, the authentication of products can be checked via unique identity numbers. Bornkamm clarified that the ECommerce Directive 85 prohibits the imposition of such an ex ante duty to monitor.
86
Justice Arnold came up with a comprehensive list of ways eBay Europe could monitor more effectively. 97 However, he also made it clear that these measures are not necessarily a legal obligation to eBay Europe. 87 
